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COPYRIGHT LAW-WILL THE DENIAL OF COPYRIGHT TO AN 
AUTHOR'S RESEARCH IMPEDE SCHOLARSHIP? MILLER v. UNIVER­
SAL CITY STUDIOS, INC, 605 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of 
cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the 
metaphysics ofthe law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, 
very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent."1 
Gene Miller, a reporter for the Miami Herald, persuaded Bar­
bara Mackle,2 a kidnap victim, to publish the story of the ordeal that 
she had suffered at the hands of her abductors. Ms. Mackie related 
the details of the event to Miller, who used them to create a book 
entitled, 83 Hours Till Dawn.3 A producer for Universal City Stu­
dios read a condensed version of.Miller's book,4 thought the story 
would make a good television movie, and gave a copy of the book to 
a scriptwriter who immediately began writing a screenplay.5 In Feb­
ruary, 1972, the producer for Universal City Studios approached 
Miller for the film rights. Negotiations promptly ensued, but no 
1. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.). 
2. Mackie was staying in an Atlanta motel with her mother due to overcrowding in 
the college infirmary caused by a flu epidemic. Her abductors took her into the Georgia 
woods and buried her alive in a coffin-like, self-ventilating box. She remained in the box 
for four days and was rescued on the fifth day shortly before the life support system 
would have failed. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 984-85 (S.D. 
Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
3. Miller conducted personal research and numerous interviews with the partici­
pants in the kidnapping. He estimated expending more than 2500 hours in research, 
preparation and writing 83 Hours Till Dawn. The writing style used by Miller in his 
book was similar to that employed in recent criminal novels and historical documenta­
ries. See, e.g., Truman Capote's In Cold Blood and Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day. 
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650 
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
4. The original book was published in 1971 and was copyrighted with a condensed 
version in Reader's Digest and a serialization in the Ladies Home Journal. Miller v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1367 (5th Cir. 1981). 
5. Id. In January, 1972, William Frye, a producer for Universal City Studios, gave 
a copy of Miller's book to a scriptwriter named Gerard who never returned it. Miller v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
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agreement was reached.6 Universal City Studios later produced and 
aired on national television a movie entitled, The Longest Night. 
Miller consequently brought suit claiming infringement of 
copyright.7 
At trial, Miller testified to numerous similarities between the 
book and the television movie. The jury, which had been given cop­
ies of the book and which had viewed the movie twice during the 
trial, found copyright infringement and awarded Miller damages 
and lost profits in excess of twenty-thousand dollars.8 Defendants 
strenuously objected to the jury instruction that research in the prep­
aration of a book is copyrightable.9 The trial judge denied defend­
ants' motion for a new trial, whereupon, defendants appealed. The 
Fifth Circuit, in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 10 reversed the 
lower court and stated: "This instruction, at best confusing, at worst 
wrong, was given with some reluctance by the trial court over the 
strenuous objection of defendants on the urging by plaintiff, 'That's 
the heart of the case.' "11 The Miller court12 declared that while 
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of copyright in­
fringement and a judgment for plaintiff, such an instruction con­
tained an erroneous view of the law and constituted a reversible 
error.13 The appellate court reversed the lower court's verdict for 
plaintiff and remanded the case for a new trial. The importance of 
6. Id. at 985-86. 
7. The scriptwriter, Gerard, claimed that he used the Reader's Digest article in 
writing much of the script before receiving a transcript of the trial court proceedings. He 
used the transcript to check his facts. By April 21, 1972, a full run script was completed 
and Gerard admitted to using the book itself after April 5th to check factual details not 
available elsewhere. He testified to the belief that Universal City Studios and Miller had 
reached an agreement upon which Gerard relied in writing the screenplay. Particularly 
damning evidence against defendants was a memo sent from Gerard to Frye on March 7, 
1972, confessing that the news stories available were far too general and contained al­
most no detail to support the scenes written. Consequently, all that was available, and all 
that Gerard used, was Miller's book and such use was forbidden. Id. at 986. 
8. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1367 (5th Cir. 1981). 
9. Id. at 1367-68. The district trial court judge instructed the jury, in part, that: 
Similarly, in a case like the instant one, which deals with factual matters such as 
news events, the facts themselves are not copyrightable but the form of expres­
sion of the facts and their arrangement and selection are copyrightable. More­
over, If an author, in writing a book concerning factual mailers, engages in 
research on those mailers, his research is copyrightable. . 
Id. at 1368 (emphasis in original). 
10. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
II. Id. at 1368. 
12. In order to distinguish the trial and appellate court decisions, throughout this 
note the "Miller court" will be used to designate the decision of the appellate court. 
13. 650 F.2d at 1368. 
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the erroneous instruction was underscored by the realization that it 
was embedded in a field of otherwise proper instructions. 14 
In its decision that research by an author is not protected by 
copyright, the court of appeals in Miller drew a distinction between 
uncopyrightable facts and the copyrightable expression of facts. 15 In 
reaching this decision, the appellate court relied heavily on the 
premise that research involved only the gathering of facts without 
any degree of self-expression. 16 In contrast to the appellate court's 
narrow definition of research, the trial court in Miller v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 17 had held that such research was protected by 
copyright. IS The trial court freely recognized the traditional copy­
right truism that facts and events are in themselves not copyright­
able. Thus, it did not seek to challenge the distinction between facts 
and expression. 19 The essence of the trial court's decision was its 
perception of the nature of research: "The court views the labor and 
expense of the research involved in the obtaining of those un­
copyrightable facts to be intellectually distinct from those facts and 
more similar to the expression of the facts than to the facts them­
selves."2o Research was viewed by the trial court as more than a 
mere gathering of facts; it was viewed as involving some degree of 
intellectual effort and self-expression.21 The court noted that if the 
public expects individuals to labor on its behalf to obtain factual 
knowledge, then the public must be prepared to compensate them in 
the same manner as those who give expression to facts.22 Another 
key difference between the appellate and trial court decisions was the 
trial court's refusal to fear the creation of a monopoly in factual ma­
terial if research was held to be copyrightable.23 
14. Id. at 1367. 
15. Id. at 1371-72. 
16. Id. at 1372. 
17. 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
18. Id. at 988. 
19. Id. at 987. 
20. Id. In further explaining this distinction, the court quoted the Second Circuit 
which said that the distinction in copyright between the expression of an idea and the 
idea is an attempt" 'to reconcile two competing societal interests: rewarding an individ­
ual's ingenuity and effort while at the same time permitting the nation to benefit from 
further improvements or progress resulting from others' use of the same subject matter.' " 
Id. at 987-88 (quoting Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d 
Cir.), urI. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976». 
21. Id. at 987. 
22. 460 F. Supp. at 988. 
23. It further appears to the court that other individuals are not deprived of 
the opportunity ofobtaining knowledge of facts by one individual's copyright 
of his research of those facts and that therefore the nation may still benefit from 
106 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5: 103 
This note will highlight the flaws in the rationale utilized by the 
appellate court in its denial of copyright protection to the research of 
an author. The constitutional and statutory history of the current 
copyright law will be examined to provide perspective on the major 
purpose of copyright protection. Next, the reasoning of the appellate 
court will be analyzed to determine the primary goals of the decision 
and the impact that such a decision will have on the current work of 
authors. Finally, this note will discuss the manner in which the ex­
tension of copyright protection to an author's research is supported 
by both the policies of copyright protection and existing case law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Constitutional Foundation of Copyright 
When the drafters of the Constitution met in Philadelphia in 
1787, the importance of encouraging an author's intellectual effort 
by protecting the fruits of his labor from theft had long been recog­
nized.24 The primary concern of the drafters was to benefit the pub­
lic by promoting the production of literary, scientific and artistic 
works.25 To encourage such production, the Constitution granted 
power to the newly created Congress to enact legislation that would 
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries."26 This clause encompassed 
the power to grant patent as well as copyright protection.27 
further improvements or progress resulting from other individuals' use of those 
facts. 
Id. 
24. See A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 2-3 (5th ed. 1979). Copyright law as 
related to literary and artistic property is essentially an inheritance from England. From 
medieval times the author's right to his or her manuscript was recognized on principles of 
equity and natural justice. With the invention of printing, works could be produced in 
quantity for circulation. And the author lost his protection as soon as the work got into 
print. This injustice ultimately led to the first copyright statute. See id. Contra L. PAT­
TERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143-50 (1968). 
By the close of the American Revolution, every state except Delaware had passed 
laws to protect authors. These laws, however, were limited in operation to the bounda­
ries of their respective states. Thus, an author in one state who wished to secure protec­
tion for his work throughout the states, was obliged to travel to every state and comply 
with its individual copyright statute. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 4 (5th ed. 1979). 
25. "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by per­
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.''' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
27. Copyright differs from patent essentially in subject matter, conditions of pro­
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The copyright clause was not enacted as a rigid standard against 
which all copyright legislation was to be measured. Rather, it was 
designed to be flexible and to suggest certain minimal elements to be 
contained in copyright statutes.28 Future statutes were intended to 
be malleable to the necessities of changing times.29 The introductory 
phrase, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ..." 
was intended to be read expansively and was not intended to be con­
strued as a constitutional limitation upon the scope of the works pro­
tected.30 The phrase was to be a preamble, setting forth the purpose 
of the power rather than the limitation of its exercise.31 
Within the constitutional framework, the subject matter of 
copyright must possess two essential elements: The work must be 
the original creation of an "author";32 and "[t]he work must consti­
tute a 'writing,' that is, it must be fixed in some tangible form from 
which the work can be reproduced."33 
The first element demands that the work, in order to be pro­
tected by copyright, be the product of original, creative authorship. 
There are two interrelated components: originality34 and creativ­
tection, and extent of protection afforded. Basically, patents are granted for machines, 
processes, devices and instruments, but only after the United States Patent Office has 
searched the "prior art" and determined that the invention is, among other things, novel 
and unique. Copyrights are not granted by any government agency, but are created by 
the actions of the author. The author may register his copyright with the United States 
Copyright Office, but his claim is not verified by a search of earlier registrations. The 
copyrighted work need not be novel, nor be an invention, it need only be "original," that 
is, created without copying. Patent is the greater monopoly. The patentee may exclude 
anyone from the field covered by the patent, however independently the latter may have 
developed the same invention. Under copyright, a person working independently would 
not infringe the original work, no matter how identical, so long as the subsequent author 
could prove that he had created his work without any knowledge or reference to the 
original author'S work. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 1-2. 
28. I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1-30 (rev. ed. 1982). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 1-30.2. 
32. M. PETERS, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 at 3:1 (1977). 
An author is any person who creates a work by means of his own original effort. I M. 
NIMMER, supra note 28, at 1-37. 
33. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3: 1. 
34. I M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-2-5 to 2-15. Under the 1909 Act, originality 
was neither defined nor expressly required. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 
(amended 1976). The courts, however, have consistently inferred from the United States 
Constitution that originality is a prerequisite to copyright protection since it can only be 
claimed by authors. See, e.g., Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d 
Cir. 1980). Since an author is defined as the originator, beginner or creator of the work, 
it must follow that originality is essential to copyrightability of a work. Under the Copy­
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ity.3S "The work must be original in the sense that the author pro­
duced it by his own intellectual effort, as distinguished from merely 
copying a preexisting work. There is no requirement of novelty, in­
genuity, or esthetic merit."36 Therefore, a work may be original even 
if it is in every respect identical to a work already in existence, so 
long as the author can prove that his work originated solely and in­
dependently by means of his own creative effort.37 A work's origi­
nality, as demonstrated by skill, training, knowledge, and judgment 
alone, will not support an author's claim that the work is copyright­
able. Only when those qualities are utilized in the act of authorship 
will they support such a claim, for it is only an author who may 
qualify for copyright protection.38 The quantum of creativity de­
manded is minimal. Any distinguishable variation from a prior 
work will suffice as long as the variation is the product of the au­
thor's independent creative labor.39 
The second essential element in a work for which an author 
seeks copyright protection requires that the work be in the form of a 
"writing."40 The writing requirement has been liberally construed by 
the courts in order to give it a content sufficient to encompass the 
artistic and technological developments of contemporary society.41 
right Act of 1976, copyright is granted only to "original works of authorship." Copyright 
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
35. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3:1. 
36. Id. 
37. This principle of copyright law was best expressed by Judge Learned Hand 
who stated: "if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew 
Keats' [sic] Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, 
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats' [sic]." Shel­
don v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cerl. 
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). 
38. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 58-59 (1884). The 
copyright requirement of originality must be distinguished from the patent requirement 
of novelty. Since originality is more easily proven than novelty, a copyright is more 
easily protected than a patent, although the scope of the rights protected is more narrow. 
Where a patent owner can prove infringement merely by showing substantial similarity, 
the copyright owner must prove both substantial similarity and copying. See Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,54 (2d Cir. 1936), cerl. denied, 298 U.S. 669 
(1936). 
39. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903); Amster­
dam v. Triangle Publications, 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3rd Cir. 1951); Alfred Bell & Co. v. 
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 
150 F.2d 512,513 (2d Cir. 1945). 
40. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3: I. 
41. The basic rationale for the constitutional interpretation of ''writings'' was set 
out in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In Reiss, 
Judge Hand denied the proposition that the courts should follow inflexibly the language 
of the Constitution as understood in 1789, and stated: 
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The Supreme Court, consistent with the policy of liberal construc­
tion, has stated that" 'writings' . . . include any physical rendering 
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."42 The scope 
of a writing has not been limited to printed or written works, but has 
been held to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, and 
etching.43 In addition, works of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural art 
are included within the Court's definition.44 Visual perception of the 
writing is not an essential prerequisite, for the Supreme Court has 
held that sound recordings of artistic performances constitute writ­
ings in the constitutional sense.45 Thus, any form of a work that can 
be reproduced or otherwise copied will suffice to qualify the work in 
the constitutional sense of the term. 
The writings of authors, therefore, are the basic constitutional 
essentials as to the scope of copyrightable works. While the value of 
copyright protection has been recognized since the inception of the 
republic, the statutory scope of the protection has undergone a meta­
morphosis commencing with the enactment of the first federal copy­
right statute in 1790.46 The list of works subject to copyright 
protection has been expanded constantly over the years, yet the pa­
rameters of copyright protection remain obscure.47 
B. Statutory Foundation of Copyright 
Congress, in carrying out its constitutional mandate "[t]o pro­
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ,"48 has enacted 
seven major copyright statutes. The first copyright act in 1790 ex­
tended protection to the author or his assigns, of any book, map or 
[I]ts grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then known, but 
what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter. Of course, the new subject­
matter must have some relation to the grant; but we interpret it by the general 
practices of civilized peoples in similar fields, for it is not a straight-jacket, but a 
charter for a living people. 
Id. at 719. 
42. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
43. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). In 
Bleislein the Supreme Court upheld the copyrightability of a circus poster used for ad­
vertising purposes. Id. at 252. The Supreme Court also held that a photograph is a 
writing in the constitutional sense. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 
53, 60 (1884). 
44. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973). 
45. Id. 
46. The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.c. 
§§ 101-810 (1976». 
47. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 22-24. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. 
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chart for a period of fourteen years.49 Gradually, the scope of the 
protection under the 1790 Act has been enlarged to keep pace with 
advances in science and literature.50 For example, additions in­
cluded the following: in 1802, prints;51 in 1831, musical composi­
tions;52 in 1856, dramatic compositions;53 in 1865, photographs;54 
and in 1870, paintings, drawings, sculpture, and models or designs 
for works of the fine arts.55 The most recent stage in this enlarge­
ment was the Copyright Act of 1909.56 The language of the 1909 Act 
extended copyright protection to "all the writings of an author."57 
This language created considerable confusion as to the extent of the 
protection afforded. 58 Thus, in a recent enactment, Congress delib­
erately avoided use of the phrase. 59 Congress provided instead, in 
section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act, for the protection of "original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."60 
The 1976 Act further clarified the scope of the protection afforded to 
writings by enumerating a list of illustrative categories under which 
a work might be included. This list was expressly declared to be 
illustrative and non-limitative.61 The belief that Congress sought to 
exercise its full constitutional power to cover all possible works was 
supported by the argument that the language of the 1909 Act echoed 
the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.62 Congress, 
however, had done little to clarify the cryptic phraseology in the 
1909 Act.63 The ambiguity of the 1909 Act presumably was laid to 
49. The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, I Stat. 124 (current version at 17 u.s.c. 
§§ 101-810 (1976». 
50. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 7-14; Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 
YALE L.J. 48 (1925). 
51. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171. 
52. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436. 
53. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, II Stat. 138. 
54. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. 
55. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. 
56. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended 1976) [hereinafter cited 
as 1909 Act]. 
57. /d. § 4; see a/so id. §§ 5, 7. 
58. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 22-24. 
59. 17 U.S.c. § 102(a) (1976). The removal of such language was designed to 
"avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field and to 
eliminate the uncertainties" arising from the ''writings of an author" terminology. S. 
REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
51 (1976). 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). 
61. Id. 
62. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 22-24. 
63. The drafting committee of the House of Representatives attempted to clarify 
their choice of words by stating: 
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rest by the Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California.64 The Court, in 
a five-to-four decision, stated that in the sixty years since the enact­
ment of the 1909 Act, neither the Copyright Office, the courts, nor 
the Congress had interpreted the scope of copyright protection to be 
as broad as the language of the 1909 Act.65 
The 1976 Act declares that, "[c)opyright protection subsists, in 
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression . . . ."66 The first half of this 
delineation uses the phrase "original works of authorship" to define 
the scope of copyrightable works. Congress elected not to exercise 
its full authority to extend copyright protection to all the possible 
writings of an author.67 Nevertheless, works of authorship are not 
limited to the seven broad categories of works listed under section 
102(a) of the 1976 Act.68 Congress purposely left the phrase unde­
fined69 so as to create a flexible standard. Thus, when applying the 
standard, courts have the discretion to extend protection to types of 
works either not expressly mentioned in section 102(a) or not yet in 
existence. The second half of the 1976 Act's delineation declares 
that applicable works must be "fixed in any tangible medium of ex­
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device."70 Fixation in tangible form is 
both a statutory and constitutional necessity, for unless a work can 
be reduced to tangible form it cannot be interpreted as a writing 
Section 4 is declaratory of existing law. It was suggested that the word "works" 
should be substituted for the word "writings" in view of the broad construction 
given by the courts to the word "writings," but it was thought better to use the 
word "writings" which is the word found in the Constitution. It is not intended 
by the use of this word to change in any way the construction which the courts 
have given to it. 
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 210 n.18 (1954), 
64. 412 U.S. 546 (1973), 
65. Id. at 567. 
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). 
67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
68. The list is meant to illustrate, not to limit, and is not drafted to exhaust the 
scope of "original works of authorship" that the bill is intended to protect. H.R. REP. 
No, 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), 
69. ''The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable technology 
or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional 
intent." Id. at 51. 
70. 17 U.S,c' § 102(a) (1976). 
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within the meaning of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.71 
There remain two concepts which are essential to a thorough 
understanding of the scope of statutory copyright. The first is the 
distinction between the work itself and the material object in which 
the work is embodied.72 Such a material object is either a copy or a 
phonorecord.73 While an individual author may own the copyright 
in the work of his creation, he does not necessarily own the material 
object in which it is embodied. The second and more important con­
cept is the dichotomy between an idea and the expression of an 
idea.74 The distinction between idea and expression is the most criti­
cal and elusive principle in copyright law.75 It applies not only to the 
question of whether a work is copyrightable, but also to the question 
of infringement. Simply stated, an idea may never be copyrighted; it 
is only the expression of an idea that may be copyrightedJ6 This 
distinction was granted express statutory recognition for the first 
time in the 1976 Act.77 The value of an idea to society is so precious, 
that where the idea and its expression have become so fused as to be 
inseparable, the law will deny copyright to the expression.78 Ideas, 
like facts, are essential to the welfare and progress of society. They 
will be zealously protected from monopoly. It is within this frame­
work that the Miller appellate court decision will be critically 
discussed. 
71. See generally I M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-28. See also supra note 35-40 
and accompanying text. 
72. I M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-31 to 2-32. 
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). "Under this definition 'copies' and 'phonorecords' to­
gether will comprise all of the material objects in which copyrightable works are capable 
of being fixed." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976). 
74. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 31-33. 
75. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3:7. 
76. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Baker v. Selden, WI U.S. 99 (1879). 
In works of fiction, abstract outlines of the plot or characters are nonprotectible themes 
or ideas and their use is not infringement of copyright. Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp.,45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cerro denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). In historical or 
biographical works the underlying content of facts are similarly treated as ideas and 
denied protection. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 
303 (2d Cir. 1966). 
77. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis­
covery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). 
78. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Foundation ofthe Decisions 
The Miller court premised its decision that research was not 
copyrightable on three points. The first was that the distinction be­
tween uncopyrightable facts and copyrightable expression of facts 
provides the means for balancing the public interest in creative activ­
ity against the public need for unrestrained access to information.79 
The second was that the holding would allow subsequent authors to 
build upon prior accomplishments of others without duplication of 
effort.80 The third premise was that to hold research copyrightable 
would be to hold that the facts discovered as a result of research are 
themselves copyrightable.81 
The court formulated these points by relying on two primary 
sources of authority. In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, 
Inc .,82 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared that 
copyright law does not absolutely preclude an author "from saving 
time and effort by referring to and relying upon prior published ma­
terial."83 The Rosemont court reasoned that to forbid the use of 
prior works as resource material for another's research would lead to 
meaningless waste and inefficiency, possibly discouraging others 
from undertaking the task and almost certainly resulting in the im­
pairment of historical knowledge.84 The court also expressed a con­
cern that an author cannot "acquire by copyright a monopoly in the 
narration of historical events."85 
The other primary source of authority for the Miller court was 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. s6 In Hoehling, plaintiff had 
written an historical account of the destruction of the German dirigi­
ble' Hindenberg. In the account the author proposed the hypothesis 
that the destruction of the dirigible was the result of sabotage by a 
crew member motivated by political and romantic passion.87 De­
fendant later wrote a book advancing the same hypothesis and ad­
mitted use of plaintiffs book as a research toops The Hoehling 
79. 650 F.2d at 1371. 
80. Id. at 1372. 
81. Id. 
82. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). 
83. Id. at 310. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 306. 
86. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). 
87. Id. at 974-76. '. 
88. Id. at 976. 
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court held that there had been no infringement, primarily because 
the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow and embraces 
no more than the author's original expression of particular facts and 
theories already in the public domain.89 The Hoehling court also 
sought to avoid a chilling effect on future authors who might con­
template tackling an historical event by declaring that broad latitude 
must be granted to the subsequent author who makes use of prior 
historical subject matter, including theories or plots.90 The Miller 
court relied on both Rosemont9I and Hoehling92 to formulate its 
strongest argument against extension of copyright protection to re­
search: that such protection would create a monopoly in factual ma­
terial by the original author.93 
The Miller decision was reached because of two basic concerns: 
The law should not discourage other authors from attempting to pro­
vide fresh insight into previously researched issues and events; and, 
the law should not grant a monopoly to an author over facts and 
theories. Each of these concerns originated from the distinction be­
tween idea and expression in copyright law.94 Facts, like ideas, may 
never be subject to copyright protection. Facts are the raw material 
of scholarly research and knowledge and, as such, must be protected 
as the common property of all.95 
To reveal why the decision of the appellate court in Miller be­
trays these basic concerns, its rationale must be compared with the 
rationale of the trial court. The trial court did not seek to oppose the 
89. ld. at 974. The Hoehling court was concerned about granting an author a mo­
nopoly in historical facts. 
The copyright provides a financial incentive to those who would add to the 
corpus of existing knowledge by creating original works. Nevertheless, the pro­
tection afforded the copyright holder has never extended to history, be it docu­
mented fact or explanatory hypothesis. The rationale for this doctrine is that 
the cause of knowledge is best served when history is the common property of 
all, and each generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights 
ofthe past. Accordingly, the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow 
indeed, embracing no more than the author's original expression of particular 
facts and theories already in the public domain. 
ld. 
90. ld. at 978. 
91. See supra notes 82-85. 
92. See supra notes 86-90. 
93. 650 F.2d at 1371-72. 
94. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
95. 650 F.2d at 1369. For an analysis of the relationship between facts, the expres­
sion of facts and the subject matter of copyrightable works, see I M. NIMMER, supra note 
28, at 2-34; Denicola, Copyright in Collections 01 Facts: A Theory lor the Protection of 
NonJiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981). 
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basic tenet of copyright law. In his instructions to the jury, the trial 
judge expressly stated that facts themselves are not copyrightable; 
on"ty the form of expression of the facts, their arrangement, and se­
lection are copyrightable.96 The real distinction between the trial 
and appellate court analyses rests in their definitions of the nature of 
research and their interpretations of the value of the economic stim­
ulus which copyright protection of research would afford the author. 
The wisdom of the holding, which denies copyright protection to an 
author's research, must also be examined in the light of the similarity 
between research and the compilation of facts in a directory, to 
which copyright protection has been expressly extended. Through 
analysis of the appellate court's rationale, the wisdom of this deci­
sion and the future impact it will exert on authors may be 
ascertained . 
.B. The Essence ofResearch 
A fundamental reason for the Miller court's denial of copyright 
protection to research was the court's refusal to recognize research as 
anything more than a collection of factual details.97 The Miller court 
failed to recognize that the substance of research is not merely the 
collection of facts, but the interpretation and significance attributed 
to the facts by the compiler. 
The very act of compiling facts necessitates the selection of cer­
tain details and the rejection of others. The researcher must make a 
conscious decision to pursue a given path of investigation and to or­
der facts in a unique style. Although any person may, in time, un­
cover exactly the same facts as the original author, it is highly 
improbable that the second author will uncover them in exactly the 
same order and marshal them with precisely the same degree and 
form of expression. The very nature of research is such that the 
unique manner in which one uncovers the facts and information 
must invariably lead to a substantial degree of self-expression in 
compilations utilizing those facts. Not all authors engage in research 
with the same degree of self-expression. To those who merely gather 
facts with a minimum of analysis, a minimum of copyright protec­
tion is afforded.98 It must be stressed that only the expression of the 
author may be protected.99 The facts gathered during the research 
96. 460 F. Supp. at 987. 
97. 650 F.2d at 1372. 
98. Accord 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). 
99. Although in the case of a compilation of facts, the labor of the compiler alone 
may be sufficient to receive protection. See infra notes 123- 133 and accompanying text. 
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are public property and may be freely used without restriction. To 
declare flatly that no part of an author's research is entitled to copy­
right protection is to grant a license to copy not only facts, but to 
copy the self-expression of the author as well. 
The nature of research was well illustrated in Wainwright Secur­
ities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp .100 Plaintiff was an institu­
tional analyst and stock broker who published in depth analytical 
reports on industrial, financial, utility, and railroad corporations. 101 
Defendant copied and published, in its newspapers, abstracts of 
plaintiffs institutional research reports. In issuing an injunction to 
prevent further publication by the defendant, the Wainwright court 
held that there was verbatim appropriation of the plaintiffs copy­
righted analytical research reports. The appropriated material in­
cluded financial analyses and predictions, representing substantial 
investment of time, money, and labor. 102 The court outlined the 
scope of the rights protected and noted that when considering copy­
right protection for a news event, it is important to differentiate be­
tween the substance of the information contained in the report, that 
is, the event itself and the particular form or collocation of words in 
which the author has chosen to communicate it. 103 "What is pro­
tected is the manner of expression, the author's analysis or interpre­
tation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals 
facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular 
developments."I04 This is research: not simply the mindless collect­
100. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977). 
101. Id. The reports examined a company's financial characteristics, trends in the 
industry, major developments within the company, growth prospects and profit expecta­
tions. The analyst'S conclusions and predictions were a major feature of the reports. 
Often, such research reports required several months of preparation including interviews 
of corporate officials. Id. at 93. 
102. Id. at 95-97. 
103. Id. at 95 (quoting International News Servo v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 
234 (1918». 
104. 558 F.2d at 95-96. "The essence of infringement lies in taking not a general 
theme, but in appropriating the particular expression through similarities of treatment, 
details, scenes, events and characterization." Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 
533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). In Wainwright, the court 
criticized the defendant's appropriation for not providing independent analysis or re­
search; for not soliciting comments on the same topics from other financial analysts; and 
for not including any independent criticism, praise or other reaction from industry offi­
cials or investors. 558 F.2d at 95-97. The Wainwright court was convinced that the de­
fendant had contributed nothing of its own creativity to the research reports of the 
plaintiff. Id. These reports were largely composed of facts available to anyone with the 
diligence to compile them, and of analysis that was the creation of the author. Facts and 
theories are not copyrightable, yet this was the substance of the plaintiffs research report 
and was recognized by the court as copyrightable. The court granted copyright based on 
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ing of facts, but analysis and interpretation of events as well as struc­
turing material and organizing facts into a thesis with emphasis on 
particular developments. 
The research of an author in preparation for writing a book is 
analogous to a financial research report. Both involve laborious col­
lecting, organizing, and compiling of facts and data, including nu­
merous interviews with principals and witnesses, and the 
formulation of theories and predictions based on the facts and data 
gathered. Both involve originality of expression and both should be 
subject to copyright protection. 
The 1976 Copyright Act seeks to protect the work of an author 
as soon as the author's creative independent labor has assumed any 
tangible mediuin of expression. lOS The goal of the 1976 Act is to 
protect the original self-expression of the author from the instant the 
created work comes into existence. 106 It seeks to abolish the pitfalls 
of notice and registration which, in the past, have denied protection 
to deserving authors. 107 If research truly involves more than a sterile 
assemblage of facts, then to deny it copyright protection is directly 
contrary to the goal of the 1976 Act. 108 Research contains self-ex­
pression as soon as the researcher commits to paper the facts and 
data which are the core of his future work. This self-expression de­
serves immediate copyright protection. To postpone protection until 
the work is published is to violate the purpose of the 1976 Act. 
It is a court's task to determine the point at which research has 
incorporated sufficient self-expression so as to be properly classified 
as an author's work109 and subject to copyright protection. The de­
termination is an exercise in arbitrary line-drawingllO and will de­
pend on the style of the individual author. Yet the line must be 
drawn, and the point at which it is drawn will have a direct impact 
on the work of the author. A possible explanation for Miller was a 
the time, labor and expense spent in compiling the facts and data in the reports. Copy­
right was also recognized to the degree that the analyst contributed originality of expres­
sion to the financial data and the analysis and predictions of the corporation's future 
prospects. Id. 
105. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 12. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying 
text. 
106. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 12. 
107. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 10:1. 
108. See supra text accompanying note 106. 
109. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
110. Commenting on the necessity of line-drawing, Judge Learned Hand said, 
"while we are as aware as anyone that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, 
that is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts must answer in nearly 
all cases." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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desire by the court to avoid such arbitrary line-drawing. When re­
search is declared to be uncopyrightable, the line is drawn at the 
time the manuscript is published. This, however, would be in direct 
contradiction to both the spirit and the express provisions of the 1976 
Copyright ACt. 111 The court desired to prevent a monopoly in fac­
tual details and to avoid wasteful duplication of effort and re­
sources. 112 The court achieved these goals declaring research to be 
uncopyrightable, but at a price. The price was removal of the labor 
and expense of conducting research from copyright protection. 
C. 	 The Two Basic Concerns 0/ Copyright Law: Monopoly and 
Economic Incentive 
The Miller court sought to prevent an author from acquiring a 
monopoly in facts. I 13 Free access to factual material, even that ma­
terial discovered by a previous author, was viewed as essential in 
order to encourage future authors to investigate the same factual and 
historical events. The court desired to prevent waste, inefficiency, 
and duplication of effort. It reasoned that, since the facts discovered 
by the first author are in the public domain, they are properly subject 
to use by anyone and access to them will stimulate scholarly writing 
by removing these impediments. I 14 Although its intentions are laud­
able, the Miller court ignored the adverse effect that its ruling will 
have on the original author. Without copyright protection, any sub­
sequent author is free to copy verbatim the entire research of the 
original author. Not only may names, dates and places be taken, but 
any modicum of original interpretation or expression. In short, 
everything put down on paper while conducting research can be ap­
propriated and the original author is helpless to prevent the appro­
priation. lls Such a result elicits two concerns: First, it is unfair; and, 
second, few authors will undertake the labor of research without 
some form of protection. In response to the first concern, inequity 
Ill. The 1976 Act expressly provides that: "Copyright in a work ...subsists from 
its creation ...." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976). No longer must an author publish his work 
in order to be eligible for federal copyright protection. From the moment the work is 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, it is deemed to be created and automatically 
subject to copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 137-38 (1976). 
112. 	 650 F.2d at 1371-72. 
113. 	 Id. 
114. 	 Id. 
115. The author would then be forced to tum to the tort claims of misappropria­
tion and unfair competition for relief. For an excellent discussion of misappropriation, 
see Mitchell, Misappropriation and the New Copyright Act: An Overview, 10 GOLDEN 
GATE U.L. REV. 587 (1980). 
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strikes to the heart of copyright protection. 116 As to the second con­
cern, it violates reason and common sense to believe that anyone 
would undertake a laborious and expensive research project without 
protection from the law for the fruits of their legitimate effort.ll7 
The Miller court declared that there must be a balance between 
the rights of the individual author and the right of the public to free 
and unfettered access to information. I IS A proper balance between 
the two competing interests results in both protection and economic 
incentive to the author, and a constant supply of scholarly knowl­
edge and information to the public. This balance cannot be main­
tained if the author is denied protection for his research, because 
such denial is patently unjust and removes the incentive of economic 
gam. 
Fairness was the key to the decision in Toksvig v. Bruce Publish­
ing Co .119 Plaintiff wrote a biography of Hans Christian Andersen, 
consulting only sources written in Danish and expending three years 
of extensive labor on the project. Defendant, who could not speak or 
read Danish, consulted plaintiffs for facts and details of Andersen's 
life and completed her work in one third the time that it had taken 
plaintiff. 120 The court declared the issue to be not whether the later 
biographer could have obtained the same information by going to 
the same sources, but rather, whether she did in fact go to the same 
sources and do her own independent research. 121 The Toksvig court's 
finding of infringement was motivated by convictions of fairness and 
equity.122 The lesson from Toksvig is as follows: If a subsequent 
researcher has available to her all of the original sources, then, re­
gardless of her relative ability she must utilize these sources indepen­
dently, for the law will protect the honest labor of the original 
author. Toksvig clearly protects the effort of the first researcher and 
guarantees economic incentive, yet it is overzealous in its protection 
of facts and unnecessarily hinders the labor of future authors. Some 
courts may agree with Toksvig that equity should be the foremost 
consideration and wasteful duplication of effort must be the neces­
sary price to secure for authors the rewards of their labor. But such 
116. See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, ISO-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
117. 460 F. Supp. at 988. 
118. 650 F.2d at 1371-72. 
119. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950). 
120. Id. at 666. 
121. Id. at 667. 
122. Id. Query, whether the Toksvig court would have held the same way if the 
original sources were written in English rather than Danish. 
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draconian measures are not necessary. In extending copyright to re­
search itself, only the original expression, order of presentation, and 
method of reasoning need be protected. The individual facts are free 
to be used by all. When research is protected by copyright, the origi­
nal author is provided security for his effort in expression. Addition­
ally, future authors are free to build upon the work of others without 
the shackles of wasted resources and duplication of effort. 
D. The Copyright in Directories and Maps 
In Miller, the court ignored the significance of copyright protec­
tion granted to directories, claiming that they are unique and that 
this special protection generally has not been extended to other fac­
tual endeavors. 123 Under the statutory language of both the 1976 
and 1909 Copyright Acts, directories have been granted express 
copyright protection. 124 Directories are compilations as defined by 
the 1976 Act. 125 It is the originality involved in the selection and 
arrangement of facts which renders a compilation a protected liter­
ary work. 126 At least one decision grants directories protection based 
upon the labor and expense involved in collecting the facts.127 Al­
though one might question the logic of extending copyright to such 
compilations, such protection has long been recognized. 128 There is 
some indication that the courts will regard a biography, history, or 
other factual account as a directory based upon its judicious selec­
123. 650 F.2d at 1370. 
124. 17 U.S.c. § 102(a)(I) (1976); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5(a), 35 Stat. 
1075. The House Committee Report specifically includes directories as literary works: 
"The term 'literary works' does not connote any criterion of literary merit, or qualitative 
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional 
works and compilations of data." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976). 
125. "A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre­
existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that 
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. . .." 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
126. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-40 to 2-42. 
127. Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 
(2d Cir. 1922). Copyright for a book does not depend on literary skill or originality in 
either thought or language, but rather on the industrious labor expended in the gathering 
of the data for the directory. Id. 
128. See Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977); Adven­
tures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942); Col­
lege Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1941); Leon v. Pacific 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Rexnord, Inc. v. Modem Handling Systems, 
379 F. Supp. 1190 (D.C. Del. 1974); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. 
Directory Serv., 371 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Chain Store Business Guide, Inc. v. 
Wexler, 79 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
121 1982) THE DENIAL OF COPYRIGHT 
tion and arrangement of facts. 129 If research is nothing but a compi­
lation of facts and data devoid of any expression or interpretation, 
then it must satisfy the definition of a compilation under the 1976 
Act: a work created by the collection and assembling of facts and 
data. 130 It is the very labor involved in collecting, organizing, and 
compiling facts that must be protected. It is illogical to deny copy­
right to research as so defined. In the case of maps, 131 copyright pro­
tection will be granted as long as the originality consists largely of 
information gathered by direct observation. 132 Once again, the stan­
dard is that of original research and independent labor in the acqui­
sition and compilation of the data necessary to draw the map. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enunciated in Amsterdam v. 
Triangle Publications, Inc., 133 ''the presentation of information avail­
able to everybody, such as is found on maps, is protected only when 
the publisher of the map in question obtains originally some of that 
information by the sweat of his own broW."134 The analogy to the 
labor essential in any successful research is inescapable. 
The common thread running throughout the cases of directories 
and maps is protection for the time, expense, and labor expended in 
the collection and collation of facts and data. 135 Since copyright 
cannot protect the facts themselves, it must shift the protection to the 
honest labor of the compiler. Without such protection, few would 
undertake to compile a directory or draw a map since the substantial 
labor necessary to complete the task might be sacrificed by the 
wholesale appropriation of the work by a copier. Under this theory 
aloIle, research should be granted similar protection since it involves 
essentially similar labor with comparative results. 
The Miller court suggested that it would be better to recognize 
the directory cases as in a category by themselves and not to extend 
129. See Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), UrI. denied, 
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, 413 F. Supp. 385 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Huie v. National Broadcasting Co., 184 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 
Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. 
Mass. 1942). 
130. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
131. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 59-60. 
132. The direct observation rule was first expressly articulated in Amsterdam v. 
Triangle Publications, 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3rd Cir. 1951). See also Alaska Map Service, 
Inc. v. Roberts, 368 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Alaska 1973); Marken & Bielfeld, Inc. v. 
Baughman Co., 162 F. Supp. 561, 563 (E.D. Va. 1957). 
133. 189 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1951). 
134. Id. at 106. 
135. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
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their rationale to non directory cases. 136 The case cited by the court to 
support this proposition was the landmark decision of International 
News Service v. The Associated Press,137 in which the news gathered 
and reported at the plaintiffs expense was copied and sold by the 
defendant. 138 The Supreme Court in International News Service 
held that the plaintiffs right to protection lay in a claim of unfair 
competition by the defendant and rested on the inequity of allowing 
another to profit from the labor of the plaintiff in gathering the 
news.139 The character of the disputed property in International 
News Service can be distinguished from Miller in two ways. First, 
the stories sought to be protected were in the form of the barest de­
tails telegraphed to the individual newspapers and, at the moment of 
infringement, not in the form of a publishable story.140 Second, the 
value of the details depended upon their current newsworthiness. 141 
International News Service is inapposite to Miller because the event 
depicted in the Miller book had long ceased to be current news and 
the research involved in writing the book consisted not only of facts, 
but of considerable self-expression as well. The Miller court's rea­
soning supports the conclusion that research for a book is similar to 
the collection of facts in a directory and not analogous to the gather­
ing of facts describing a current news event. The rationale of copy­
right in directories and maps should, therefore, logically extend to 
the research necessary for the writing of a book. 
E. The Expansive Interpretation of "Writings" 
Another reason for holding that research is entitled to copyright 
protection is the expansive interpretation given by the courts to 
the term "writings of an author."142 In Rubin v. Boston Magazine 
136. 650 F.2d at 1370. 
137. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
138. Id. at 230-31. 
139. Id. The Court could not allow the plaintiff to claim copyright in news stories 
that consisted of factual details. To allow the defendant, however, to pirate the stories 
would be both unjust and would discourage the plaintiff from continuing to gather and 
report the news. The Court preserved the rationale of copyright by declaring that de­
fendant's copying was unfair competition, thus achieving the same result. Id. at 241-42. 
For a more detailed analysis of unfair competition and misappropriation, see Mitchell, 
supra note 115. For a detailed analysis of the scope of copyright in factual and historical 
matters, see Gorman, Copyrigltt Protection lor tlte Collection and Representation ofFacts, 
76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963). 
140. 248 U.S. at 229-30. 
141. Id. at 230-31. That is, the details would not be worth publishing merely one 
day later. 
142. See, e.g., International News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 
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Co .,143 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that the term 
"writings" as used in the Constitution and the copyright statutes is 
intended to be read expansively, so as to include all the writings of 
an author.l44 In Goldstein v. California 145 the Supreme Court 
granted an extensively broad interpretation to the term "writings," 
declaring it to include works far removed from literary produc­
tions. l46 The Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony 147 had stated that the term "writings" in the Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution embraces "all forms of writing, printing, 
engraving, etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author 
are given visible expression."148 The ideas contained in the compila­
tion of factual details are given visible expression by the very act of 
research. 
A significant feature of the trend toward an ever expanding in­
terpretation of the term "writings" has been the slow but steady 
change in the nature and use of most copyrighted works. When the 
first copyright legislation was passed in 1790,149 the business world 
had not yet acquired the services of books, art and music, because 
the writings of authors were generally confined to instruction or en­
tertainment. 150 But gradually, copyright has been expanded, particu­
larly under judicial construction, to accommodate the growing needs 
of commerce. 151 Today it includes works which the writers and art­
ists of post-revolutionary America would have disdained. 152 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The intent of the 1976 Copyright Act was to protect the writings 
of authors from the instant that the created work came into exist­
ence. As a form of writing, the research of an author is deserving of 
(1918); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938); Reiss v. National Quotation 
Bureau, 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
143. 645 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981). 
144. Id. at 83. 
145. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
146. Id. at 561. 
147. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
148. Id. at 58. 
149. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
150. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 19-21. 
151. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 2\0 n.15 (1954); Goldstein v. California, 412 
U.S. at 561. 
152. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. at 58; American Mu­
toscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262, 266-67 (C.C.D. N.J. 1905) (both 
photographs and motion pictures are subject to copyright protection, yet neither were 
known to the drafters of the Constitution). 
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such protection. Research contains the self-expression of the author. 
The substance of research is the interpretation and significance at­
tributed to the facts and data gathered by the author. Since it is only 
the self-expression of the author which may be protected by copy­
right, the facts gathered during research are the property of all and 
may be used without restriction. To declare that no part of an au­
thor's research is entitled to copyright protection is to grant a license 
to copy not only facts, but to steal the self-expression of the author as 
well. Such a result is in direct violation of the purpose of the 1976 
Copyright Act. 
Without copyright protection, an author must conduct his re­
search in the fear that his honest labor might be stolen by another. 
Copyright law was designed to promote intellectual effort through 
the protection of economic gain. Should this protection be removed, 
few authors would undertake the labor and expense of research. In 
extending copyright protection to the research of an author, a proper 
balance is struck between the rights of an individual author and the 
right of the public to free access to information. Such a balance re­
sults in both economic incentive to the author, and a constant supply 
of scholarly knowledge and information to the public. The produc­
tion of such works was the primary goal of the copyright law. 
Tim Suich 
